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Jennings: On Authority and Justification in Public Health

ON AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFICATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH
Bruce Jennings*
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,2001, and
the mailing of items contaminated with anthrax a few weeks later, quickly
redefined the tone-and to some degree the substance-of American
political discourse. Decrying the openness of American habits, public
places, travel regulations, and even immigration laws, media
commentators and public officials alike painted a portrait of a nation
grown complacent and vulnerable. According to many, the pendulum had
swung too far in the direction of individual freedom from surveillance,
privacy, and legal constraints that had been placed on law-enforcement
authorities. This was the end of the individualistic era, many opined, and
the beginning of a new regime of greater collective security and constraint.
It did not require the tragic and shocking events of 9/11 to demonstrate
that the public health infrastructure, at least, had deteriorated to an
alarming extent after decades of under-funding and official neglect.' The
priorities of the American health care system have favored clinicalmedical research and high-technology treatments for individuals.
Nonetheless, the perceived threat of bioterrorism has provided an opening
for increased funding for public health surveillance and prevention
measures. Congress has recently increased appropriations under the Public
Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000,2 and in 2002 more than $1
billion was earmarked to upgrade the nation's public health infrastructure. 3
After two years, surprisingly little has been done to improve the
capacity for a public health response to an emergency. The general
confusion that first attended the most serious natural outbreak of lifethreatening infectious disease since 9/11, the spread of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in China, Canada, and elsewhere,
demonstrates that the risk of bioterrorism is not the only reason to be
concerned about this ongoing neglect.4

* Senior Research Scholar, The Hastings Center, Garrison, New York and Lecturer, School
of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
1. Bill Frist, Public Health andNational Security: The CriticalRole of IncreasedFederal
Support, 21 HEALTH AFF. 117 (2002).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 243-247d (2000).
3. Michael Lasalandra, Docs Attend Seminar on Response to Bioterrorism, BOSTON
HERALD, Jan. 26, 2002, at 12.
4. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE

COUNCIL,
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
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COMMurny ASSESSMENT: SARS: DowN BUT STILL A THREAT (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.odc.gov/nic/pubs/otherproducts/SARS/ICA03_09.htm.
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There are various political, financial, and scientific reasons for this lack
of progress. Professor Lawrence Gostin's timely and insightful analysis
takes a different tack and places this problem squarely within the context
of American (and more broadly, Western) legal and moral traditions. After
summarizing the nature and extent of the risk of bioterrorism as he sees it,
Gostin describes and defends an approach to the moral justification for
coercive public health measures. These measures are similar to those
authorized in a model statute that he helped to create at the request of the
Centers for Disease Control, the Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act (MSEHPA). In When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, Gostin
discusses the nature of normative justification in public health law, policy,
and practice and the principled moral foundations of public health today.'
Simply put, his thesis is that we will not be able to mount an adequate
public health response unless we have the conceptual resources and the
political-moral vocabulary necessary to justify it. Gostin writes: "The
pitched battle over civil and economic liberties in an era of bioterrorism
will not be settled without a principled framework for balancing individual
and collective interests." 6 This is an important topic, and it is surprising
how little attention has been paid to it and how little dialogue exists, as yet,
between the fields of public health and political theory.
There is much in Gostin's rich article that could be discussed at length.
The aspect upon which I focus here is his attempt to show that within the
liberal tradition of political theory we do in fact have the necessary and
proper resources to justify, both legally and morally, substantial restraints
on individual autonomy. I believe that he is largely correct in this
hypothesis, but that the theoretical pathway necessary to come to this
conclusion is more complex and circuitous than he allows. My purpose
here is not so much to refute Gostin's argument as to reframe it, and to
pose some additional questions about the relationship between public
health policy and political theory.
In particular, there are two large topics looming in the background of
this discussion that I propose to explore more explicitly and in a different
key than Gostin does. The first has to do with the nature and foundations
of authority in public health. Public health has a considerable grant of legal
power under the Constitution (the power of public health officials derives
from the inherent "police powers" of the state) and in its historical role as
an arm of the modem state.' The second topic concerns the logic and
dynamics of normative justification in public health conceived as a mode
5. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations
on Personal and Economic Liberties Justied?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
6. Id. at 1108.
7. LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN, PUBuC HEALTH LAW: PoWER, DUTY, REsTRArNT 25-83 (2000).
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of democratic practice and shaped by a moral discourse with particular
semantic (that is, meaning-making) features.
First, I will discuss the authority of public health policy. Gostin
grounds the authority of limiting personal liberty in the severity of the risk
posed to public health and the harm that could be caused if liberty were not
curtailed. But, by grounding authority on protection of interests, his
argument partakes of a long-standing tendency within the liberal tradition
to empty the concept of authority of its normative content. Liberalism, I
argue, does not have a philosophically coherent normative concept of
authority, but tends to convert authority into legitimacy. In order to avoid
this result, political theories generally must posit more than the prevention
or protection of individuals from harm as their guiding moral purpose;
they must also make room for the promotion of individuals flourishing in
accordance with some conception of the human good.
Second, I will address the politics of moral justification in public
health. Gostin's account of moral justification itself is, if I may say so,
overly "legalistic" and insufficiently "political" in character. It does not do
justice to the dynamic, deliberative, and conflict-ridden interpretive
process that marks actual political discourse and which also marks the
process of (contested) moral justification in public health. It is this contrast
between a juridical conception of moral reasoning and a deliberative
democratic conception that characterizes one of the most important
differences between liberalism and democratic communitarianism. In his
discussion of communitarianism, Gostin unduly neglects its deliberative
democratic side, while highlighting its emphasis on collective obligation.
Gostin's communitarians understand and obey their duty to the common
good, but I think they see the common good as something pre-existing and
external and do not see it as a way of life constituted by their own moral
praxis. I should like to change that perception.
I
From what source do public health policies, programs, or interventions
draw their authority and legitimacy in a liberal democratic state? Notice
that these two concepts are not exactly synonymous, although at least since
the time of Max Weber, we tend to use them as if they were
interchangeable. 8 Authority is essentially an ethical, normative
concept-the power that is wielded by officials is not transformed into
genuine authority unless it is morally justified. Legitimacy is essentially
a sociological and descriptive notion. It points not to rational justification

8. See generally John H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in POWER AND
COMMUNITY: DISSENTING ESSAYS INPOLITCAL SCIENCE 276 (Philip Green & Sanford Levinson
eds., 1970).
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but to actually existing beliefs, sentiments, and loyalties in a political
culture under certain historical conditions. Only good reasons can
challenge authority; better reasons than the holders of authority are able to
mount. But many winds can undermine legitimacy and the reasons do not
have to be good ones or even reasons, strictly speaking, at all.
These concepts tend to blur into one another as the objective or
foundational character of human reason (or divine revelation) is cast into
doubt. Two central political and ideological movements in the modem
period, democracy and liberalism, each contributed to this normative crisis
in the concept of authority, but in different ways.
Democracy contributes to the normative crisis of authority because
authoritarian political theory since Plato has held that the capacity to
discern the rationality underlying political authority was possessed only by
a very few in any society, and thus theirjudgment ought to prevail over the
beliefs of the many. In a democracy, authority must rest on reasons that are
within the reach of everyone, in principle, and virtually everyone (at least
a majority), in practice.
Perhaps less noticed, but equally significant, is the fact that liberalism
also contributes to this blurring of the lines between authority and
legitimacy, between the reasoned and the believed. This is not because
liberalism wants to spread authority out, make it more accessible and
shared more widely by common persons as democracy does, but because
liberalism is at heart distrustful of authority and very, very stingy in
granting it. To tame authority and to bring its oppressive potential to heel,
liberalism demands not just reasoned justification for the exercise of
rightful government power but reasons of a very special kind. These
reasons must somehow be grounded in the protection, preservation, and
promotion of the interests of individuals, as individualsthemselves define
those interests. (Without this latter proviso, of course, the bulwark against
the external imposition of power would be very fragile indeed.) So
authority is authoritative (rationally justified) in so far as its exercise
protects and promotes what individuals believe to be in their own best
interest. The difference between reason and belief (so vast and so
important to Plato and to most other Western political theorists prior to the
seventeenth or eighteenth century) is hollowed out; "justified authority"
turns into "legitimate authority," and whether it is legitimate gradually
becomes more an empirical than a normative question.
Gostin observes, quite rightly, that debates about the scope of the
state's public health authority often fail to differentiate the nature and
degree of the risk that purportedly calls for a public health response.9 By
distinguishing among degrees of risk (significant, moderate, negligible)

9. Gostin, supra note 5, at 1135.
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and types of state response (well-targeted interventions and arbitrary
interventions), it is possible to see that the question is not whether the use
of public health police power is ever justified, but rather what degree of
exercise of authority and interference with liberty is justified under what
circumstances. This way of formulating the issue leads naturally enough
to two closely-related notions of justification. One is the notion of
graduated response. For Gostin, as for common sense, the more significant
the risk and the more well targeted the intervention, the greater the
justification for the exercise of authority and the limitation of liberty. The
other is the notion of balancing values or interests. As Gostin sees it, the
trade-off is between personal and economic liberty and security or safety.
Interestingly, he chooses not to speak much of balancing these two
interests within the same individual, but rather to put individuals on the
liberty side and the public or a collectivity on the security side of the
equation.
The best way to construe this account of how limitations on liberty may
be justified is to view it as a series of dynamic equilibria along a
continuum of risk with various threshold points that trigger the need for a
new equilibrium. At the significant and the negligible thresholds the moral
balance of interests stabilize rather easily around security and liberty,
respectively. In the middle ground of moderate risk, even well-targeted
interventions may be quite controversial and it may be hard to achieve an
equilibrium.
One approach is to adopt Gostin's account of justification (which is
also, as I argue below, a model of moral reasoning, regarded from a
different angle), then use the approach to arrive at different types of
justifications than does Gostin. I leave this exercise to others. Another way
to get a critical purchase is to examine the implications and assumptions
behind the metaphors of moral reason and political discourse used in this
model.
The notion of degrees of risk suggests that "risk" is a concept that can
be quantified and measured and that there is a common metric available
to use to calibrate different risks and to comparatively grade them. This
way of thinking is of course widespread in the utilitarian tradition,
economics, policy analysis, and public-choice theory. However, the
normativity of risk is unstable in the same way as is authority. Risk is not
the same as probability. (Often, the discourse of public health, when
addressing "risk factors" and an increased risk of suffering from a certain
disease, is careless because it is assumed to be self-evident that the
outcome being discussed is bad, as in the case of cancer. But there are
many impairments and disabilities for which this value judgment cannot
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be assumed, but must be argued, and will be contested by reasonable
people.l1).
Risk is a function of the normative importance of a potential state of
affairs and the likelihood or probability of that state of affairs coming to
pass." While estimates of probability may be impersonal and objective,
the value estimates of what is at stake lack such an Archimedian point.
Indeed, the link between the problem of authority and risk as normative
concepts is forged within the liberal tradition by "contractarianism,"
which, in effect, makes the normative formation of the state itself into a
kind of risk-benefit exercise. It is hard to see then how the logic of moral
justification from a liberal perspective can give priority to ascertaining the
degree of risk in justifying a particular trade-off between liberty and
security. One might equally say that we must determine how to balance
liberty and security first, before we can determine whether something is
a "risk" at all, let alone before we can determine whether it is a significant,
moderate, or negligible one.
A second important metaphor in the liberal model of moral justification
is the notion of balancing. What type of activity is this supposed to be
exactly, and who-what kind of subject, what kind of agent-is doing this
activity?
In his account of moral justification and moral reasoning, John Rawls
introduces the notion of "reflective equilibrium," by which he means a
kind of taking back and forth between moral judgments or intuitions
rooted in immediate experience, on the one hand, and the moral
perspective offered by more abstract and theoretical principles and rules,
on the other.'2 Hans-Georg Gadamer offers a similar account of the
process of interpretive judgment as an interaction between the tentative
judgments about meaning given by the reader and her experiential
background (or "horizon") and the constellation of possible meanings
embedded in a text. Similar accounts may be found in Aristotle's notion
of"phronesis" and Kant's concept ofjudgment. 3 In each ofthese accounts
the activity ofjudgment is not only something that a person does, it is also
a process of deliberation that refines, educates, and shapes the person.

10. See generally DAVID R. BUCHANAN, AN ETHIc FOR HEALTH PROMOTION (2000)
(discussing reasons it may be rational to resist health promotion interventions).
11. See generally K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETrE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991) (discussing the value-laden character of the concept
of risk).
12. See Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibriumand Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76
J. PHIL. 256 (1979) (discussing Rawls' conception of moral reasoning).
13. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVSM 207-23 (1983)

(discussing interpretation and practical reasoning in Gadamer, Aristotle, and Kant).
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Moral agents make judgments and perform actions which in turn remake
them as agents.
No such interconnection between person and judgment seems to inform
the balancing metaphor. On the contrary, the activity of balancing and the
things balanced are entirely external to the person. Indeed, in the liberal
tradition, the notions most often said to be subject to balancing, and that
lend themselves most readily to this metaphor, are "interests" and
"values": precisely the notions that are taken to be external to the moral
agent in that they are the instruments through which the person's core self
makes its way through the dangers, competition, and general pushing and
shoving of the social world. But if such things as liberty and security are
merely weights on the scale, what is within the core of the self?
For what ends are liberty and security valuable in the first place? For
political theory generally, this is a tough question. In the domain of
combating terrorism and bioterrorism perhaps it is less difficult. In the
cases Gostin has in mind, the answer to that question surely must be "life"
and sometimes "protection from disease." Without these, neither liberty
nor security would have much value. But this answer won't suffice across
a wide range of cases in public health where "slightly more protection
from disease" is the answer for the individual and "statistically better
health" is the answer for the community. There must be more normative
substance to the self and to the self-in-society. Moreover, as social critics
from Thomas Hobbes to Aldous Huxley teach us, to externalize the value
and meaning of life itself from liberty and security is debatable. 4
Imagining a life devoid of liberty or security is enough to make one
realize that the moral importance of preserving life may itself hinge on the
prospect of sustaining (or regaining) a life of human flourishing and
meaning. What we really mean when we talk about balancing liberty
against other values is not an act of balancing at all but one of
interpretation: it is understanding the significance of forgoing some
desired or planned activity in the context of an overall life-plan aimed at
human flourishing, where liberty is understood as a constitutive element
in that flourishing.
Consider the following example: In evaluating the air transportation
security rule against taking knives on board airplanes, I do not balance my
liberty against my security as interests or values. I critically assess my
desire to take my knife in the context of my overall aspirations and sense
of myself and my life. In this case the conclusion is clear: My planned
activity is petty and insignificant compared to the benefits that the rule
brings to my overall life plans. I do not balance, trade-off, or sacrifice my
14. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford World's Classics 1998) (1660)
(on the worthlessness of life and liberty without security); ALDoUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
(Modem Library 1956) (1932) (on the worthlessness of life and happiness without freedom).
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liberty when I obey this rule, and the rule itself does not limit my liberty;
it enhances it. What the rule does is limit my will, and it is the will of my
desiring self, not the will of my rational self, at that. Now, if the airline
rule were that I could not take a book on board, I would likely not come
to the same assessment, and I would protest the rule and use political or
legal action to get it changed. But again I would not do so because liberty
weighed more heavily in the balancing in this case than it did in the first
case. I would fight against this rule on behalf of my larger identity as a
person and my notion of the good life, including, but not limited to,
considerations of my liberty.
This brings us to the second dimension of the model of moral
justification Gostin presents and employs. This is the notion of welltargeted versus arbitrary (excessive or pretextual) intervention. I believe
that Gostin is exactly right in arguing that when assessing the justification
for the exercise of power or coercion, one must take into account not only
the intended purposes of the intervention but also the nature of the means
employed.' 5 This line of reasoning is familiar in the legal doctrines of strict
scrutiny, proportionate response, and in the notion of the least restrictive
alternative in cases involving the paternalistic protection of incompetent
subjects.' 6
Nonetheless, there is an ambiguity in Gostin's discussion ofwhat welltargeted means. An intervention could be well-targeted because it was
efficient and effective at neutralizing or controlling the risk. Such an
intervention would limit the liberty only of those it was necessary to affect
in order for the public health or security operation to be successful. The
coercion would be a surgical strike; collateral damage to liberty would be
held to a minimum. On the other hand, well-targeted could mean justly,
fairly, or equitably targeted. A requirement for the moral justification of
the public health intervention would be that the intervention's burdens
(loss of liberty) and benefits (increased protection) be fairly distributed. If
we follow the now widely accepted Rawlsian notion of fairness, that
would mean that the benefits and burdens would have to be distributed
equally across the population unless a deviation from that equal
distribution could be shown to redound to the benefit of the least well off.
While there may be no inherent conflict between considerations of
efficiency and equity, in a given case a scarcity of manpower or resources
might likely mean that an operation that was more widely administered in

15. See generally WMLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY:
165-88 (2d expanded
ed. 2003) (discussing the justification of coercion).
16. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107 (1976) (explaining the logic of constitutional analysis in civil liberties jurisprudence).
THE PROPER USES OF COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY
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the name of fairness would be less effective in terms of public health
outcomes.
In pursuing further this facet of Gostin's discussion, it would be
necessary to begin to distinguish among various strands of the liberalpolitical tradition, because utilitarianism and what might be called
welfarist liberalism will define a well-targeted intervention differently
from contractarianism and egalitarian liberalism. Now there are several
candidates for the balancing scales-not just liberty and security, but
justice and security, equity and efficiency, the calculus of social benefit
versus moral and legal rights as justificatory trumps. I believe that the
conceptual difficulties mentioned above-problems encountered in giving
priority to risk or harm (the harm principle) and the balancing
metaphor-apply to the concepts ofjustice and rights as they do to liberty.
At bottom the problem comes back to the move that liberalism makes
to transform authority into legitimacy. Authority provides an objective
standard of right against which the particular individual's judgment can be
assessed and adjudicated. Legitimacy provides an indication that public or
state power is being used in a way acceptable to the private individual's
judgment in the aggregate, at least so much so that this acceptability
manifests itself in the obedient behavior of most individuals, the absence
of widespread protest or resistance, and the stability of the regime. The
logic of moral justification in the liberal tradition, and in the model
employed by Gostin, only provides-and, I would argue, can only
provide-the rationales for liberty-limiting public health policy that may
be perceived as legitimate. This logic cannot ground liberty-limiting public
health policies in authority, in a conception of moral rightness and
obligation that points to the common good and to individual human selfrealization, or flourishing.
An argument from legitimacy may be politically solid and
psychologically well-anchored. It may be rooted in perceptions of danger
and emotions of fear. And it may find reasonable support in the public as
well as the private purpose of preservation of settled ways of life, of
expectations, hopes and plans, of vested interests and familiar desires. But
these grounds for obedience and legitimacy fall short of the principled
moral grounds of obligation and authority that I think Gostin seeks, and
that we should seek in our discourse about ethics, politics, and the law in
public health. Those grounds must be the moral purpose of human
transformation and growth, not just preservation.
In the contractarian tradition specifically, and in the liberal tradition
more generally, the preservation of the individual (of life, liberty, and
property) is the basic reason for the creation of political society. That
fateful move resulted in the privatization of politics and in the elimination
of the pursuit of the good as a valid goal of life together in a shared space
of common purpose, shared civic activity, and communal authority.
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Authority exists in a form of life that morally transforms its individual
members, not from outside or above, but from within-through their
judgments, deliberations, commitments, the exercise of imagination and
purposive agency, and through their choices and actions.
At best, liberalism has been comfortable with a vision of that
transformational form of life only fitfully and sporadically. For the most
part, liberalism has wanted to create a very different kind of civic space-a
space of economically-productive cooperation, promise keeping, mutual
toleration, respect for boundaries and separations, and forbearance from
violence and harm to one another. This is a public space designed
principally to make private happiness possible. In this protected private
domain, persons can cultivate their talents and their individuality; they can
learn self-reliance, confidence, and independence; they can form personal
beliefs, commitments, and goals; they can relate to the transcendent in
security and peace so long as they respect the reciprocal rights of others to
do likewise.
For quite some time it appeared that the concept of authority could
survive in this semantic environment; that it could make the transition to
liberal modernity. In recent times, one cannot be sanguine about its
prospects. Through technology and telecommunications, the power of the
state has increased enormously since the rise of liberalism in the
nineteenth century. We make do with the discourse and the logic of
legitimacy. From time to time, however, particular fields or issues reveal
the limits of that discourse and logic. Despite Gostin's powerful analytic
skills and best efforts to stave off the conclusion, I am becoming
increasingly convinced that public health is one of those fields.
II
I turn now to the second topic that Gostin's article suggests and that I
would like to develop in my own way in ongoing discussion between
public health and political theory: a conception of the structure and

dynamics of moral discourse and justification in public health. Here I
introduce as terms of art a distinction between a judicial conception of
moral reasoning and justification, and a deliberative-democratic
conception. 7 The former centers on the notion of the interpretation and
application of general moral principles to particular decisions. The latter
centers on the activity of debate and deliberation that channels

17. 1 have previously addressed these notions in more detail. See Bruce Jennings, Bioethics
and Democracy, 34 CENTENNIAL REV. 207 (1990); Bruce Jennings, Possibilities of Consensus:
Toward DemocraticMoral Discourse, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 447 (1991); Bruce Jennings, Taking
Ethics Seriously in Administrative Life: Constitutionalism, Ethical Reasoning, and Moral
Judgment, in ETHICAL FRONTIERS INPuBuc MANAGEMENT 64 (James S. Bowman ed., 1991).
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disagreement toward consensus on practical strategies of communitybased problem solving.
In the preceding discussion of an argument that legitimates versus an
argument that authorizes, I was at pains to drive a wedge between these
two notions. The reason is that we need to be able to appeal to authority in
the justification of public health policy, not just legitimacy. In order to
have the semantic resources and environment necessary to accomplish this
objective, we must recover to some extent the notion of the civic or the
political as the space of moral transformation-it is as a democratic citizen
that I develop the capacity to discipline my conduct in certain ways; not
only because it protects my individual interests (nor even because it
promotes my interests), but also because it is conducive to the ongoing
project of mutuality, solidarity, and communal flourishing of which I too
am a part.
When it comes to the distinction between judicial- and deliberativemoral reasoning, however, my aim is not to drive a wedge in a gesture of
recovery and political reformation, but to suggest that these two modes of
politics are symbiotic and mutually reinforcing. Indeed, each is seriously
flawed and incomplete without the other.
Gostin openly embraces the judicial mode of moral reasoning, and in
this he places himself squarely within the liberal tradition. The notion of
a relatively coherent, interconnected, and stable framework of moral
principles as a touchstone for the justification of public policies and
practices stands at the heart ofthe liberal tradition's conception of political
action (just as the notion of a framework of individual interests stands at
the heart of its conception of private action). This conception leads toward
a kind of constitutional elitism (the experts should decide) and civic
privatism (let's let the experts decide) which undermines the rationale for
a more deliberative-democratic context within which to locate public
health as a practice; that is, as a structure of rule-governed conduct that has
both extrinsic (instrumental) goals and purposes and internal (intrinsic)
values and virtues. 8 In fact, the judicial mode and the deliberativedemocratic mode of moral reasoning are themselves practices in this sense,
and like all practices they require an institutional structure to sustain them.
The judicial model of politics provides one solution to the problem of
authority in liberalism. Historically, liberalism had to tread a fine line
between aristocratic authoritarianism in the early modem period of
absolute monarchy, on the one hand, and majoritarian authoritarianism in
the later period of the rise of democratic government, on the other.
Between these two unacceptable alternatives, liberalism, especially

18. SeegenerallyALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFER VIRTUE 169-89 (1981) (defining the concept
of a practice).
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American liberalism, has found three important concepts to embody its
distinctive form of politics: first, the protection of fundamental, individual
liberties (rights) in a (written) constitution; second, representative
government; and third, an independent, politically insulatedjudiciary. This
structure limits popular democracy to periodic elections and to referendum
and recall procedures in some states, to jury service, and to participation
in non-governmental organizations like political parties and special
interest groups.
If objectively-normative authority is no longer available to a society
through the exercise of reason, nor through transcendent revelation, nor
through ingrained moral intuition, then it must be embedded in some manmade product, institution, or artifice. In American political culture, that
artifice is the Constitution. Created by the Founders, it has been interpreted
by judges in a growing corpus of case law, and amended from time to time
by the elected representatives of the people at large. The principles of
political morality as articulated by political and legal philosophers,
political leaders, academic scholars, and the intelligentsia at large, are not
identical with the Constitution and constitutional law, of course, but
historically they have tended to converge, especially in those areas such
as individual civil liberties and the regulation of commerce where
liberalism as a political theory has had its greatest interest. As legislators
who are elected and accountable to the citizenry accept and embrace the
principles found in the written Constitution by impartial and non-partisan
judges, these principles become reaffirmed and enshrined over time in the
virtual constitution of public morality. At some periods constitutional
interpretation seems to lag behind public morality; at other times, as with
Brown v. Board of Education,9 for example, it may be ahead of it. But
gradually, the two seem to come into alignment.
The social, political, and cultural ramifications of landmark Supreme
Court rulings (or a series of rulings gradually fine-tuning doctrine over
many years) may often be more significant than their narrow legal
implications. Thus, legal-judicial authority tends to diffuse into political
authority as such in our political culture. And the judicial mode of moral
reasoning, the notion of applying general and abstract principles to specific
problems or cases, becomes the model for all political leadership. This
may not be so all the time, but it is when ordinary interest group political
bargaining, which impresses no one with its moral authority, is not enough
for the occasion. Thus, political representatives characterize their decisionmaking as a responsiveness to the mundane special interests of

19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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constituents combined with an attentiveness to higher principles of
political morality and the public interest.2"
When embraced in this way so widely outside the distinctive
institutions of the legal system, the judicial mode of reasoning takes on an
elitism that is much more troubling outside the courthouse, in the public
square. Judicial reasoning is a protection against what has been variously
called an excess of democracy, the tyranny of the majority, or simply mob
rule. The influence of the judicial model prompts elected representatives
to move from a delegate to a trustee style of representation. 2 Professional
and intellectual expertise and a specialization of function tend to routinize
and bureaucratize authority rather than democratize it. If political and
moral judgment hinge on the specialized training and expertise of those
who can comprehend abstract principles and then apply them correctly to
particular cases, then both participatory democracy and even delegate-style
representation are irrational, perhaps even dangerous.22 If the requisite
skills of political judgment are not widely shared, even in a society with
a relatively high level of education, then the vast majority of the
population will be better served by the rule of competitive and circulating
elites than by stronger democratic institutions and practices.23
The judicial mode ofjustifying political and policy decisions has a long
history in the field of public health and has played an important role where
the main concerns were protection from environmental contamination,
control of infectious disease, or surveillance to permit early detection and

20. Even in the field of applied and professional ethics (such as bioethics) during the last
thirty years, ethicists have described their methods in this fashion, and I believe this has helped
them find acceptance and authority among professionals and policymakers who otherwise would
not have been inclined to pay much attention to those with academic training in philosophy or the
humanities.
21. See generally HANNA F. PiTKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1972) (discussing
the difference between delegate and trustee theories of representation).
22. It may be objected that in this sketch of judicial reasoning I have both oversimplified it
as an interpretive process and exaggerated the extent to which it is a specialized skill unlike the
ordinary moral reasoning capacities of grassroots-democratic citizens. I am prepared to concede
the first objection, and perhaps the second as well, although an aura of difficulty, demanding
intelligence and the like, does seem to pervade the popular image of judges (and other judge-like
actors). For a richer and more adequate treatment of this topic than I am able to give here, see
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1996); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
Despite its shortcomings, however, this judicial model of political discourse does illuminate
much of what goes on in public health debates. In those circles, it is not unusual to encounter a
rather simplified account of applying principles of general knowledge (whether this be medical,
epidemiological, social scientific, or moral knowledge) to particular decisions and practices.
Appeals to authority based on claims of expertise in applying knowledge are a staple of the field.
23. For a thorough discussion of this line of argument, see PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY
OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE (1967).
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treatment of disease. Expertise has been appealed to in order to achieve
moral justification and authority in public health again and again, but it
can become a bad habit when too often or too readily used. In many cases
it strikes me that what really prompts a coercive or paternalistic top-down
approach in public health is not the public's inability to understand the
scientific facts, the medical rationale for the intervention, or the public
interest served. Rather, it is the fact that the liberty being limited (the
desired behavior being forgone) by the intervention indicated by public
health knowledge is too immediately important or too intensely desired to
be amenable to reasonable public dialogue and consensus building, at least
not in the amount of time available in an emergency. People use
contaminated water when they have no alternative supply readily available
to them. People practice unprotected sex or pursue certain risky lifestyles
when those activities are deeply embedded in their self-identity and sense
of self-esteem. People fail to comply with medical treatment regimens
when their lives are too hectic and too stressed and they are emotionally
fragile.
In most of the examples I can think of involving an appeal to judicialstyle decision-making in public health policy, the same outcomes could
have been justified and defended just as well through a more deliberative,
culturally respectful, and inclusive participatory process. In that case,
though, public health officials would have needed more faith in the
capabilities of ordinary citizens, and they would have needed sufficient
time and resources to undergird coercive measures with a process of
explanation, exploration of alternatives, participatory design of the
implementation of these measures, and consensus building.
The authoritative limitation of liberty does not need to be based on
expert appeal to general principles and a process of balancing in which
one's duty to the safety and well-being of the community outweighs the
individual liberty in question. The limitation of liberty can also be justified
through a process of democratic deliberation in which the harmfulness or
the wrongness of a particular kind of behavior at a particular time is
demonstrated (both through analytic reasoning and through the sharing of
personal and group narratives and cultural traditions) and functional
alternatives to the proscribed behavior are made available to meet
significant personal or communal needs.
Most individuals are ashamed to be seen publicly as being selfish; most
individuals have more than one behavioral choice to meet important
economic or psychological needs (or are willing to receive training to
increase their range of behavioral options); most individuals do not have
to be forced to care about the welfare of the community with which they
identify (if they did it would be a misnomer to call it a community) and
most individuals do not deliberately want to harm or wrong others. When
these generalizations do hold, community reaffirmation and nurturing are
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called for. When they do not hold for a large number of individuals in
certain cases, then we are indeed in the presence of extreme social
pathology and cultural breakdown, and community reclamation and civic
renewal are the appropriate long-term responses. Communities so broken
down that they cannot be revitalized will eventually be abandoned, just as
some inner-core areas of large American cities have become virtual
wastelands, with no stable or measurable population at all.
Gostin gives an interesting comparison of the way liberals and
communitarians would reason about limiting liberty in the face of risk with
well-targeted interventions."' He observes that the two schools of political
philosophy would agree in cases of significant and negligible risk, but that
they might part ways in the face of moderate risk, with the liberals tending
to err on the side of liberty and the communitarians on the side of security.
Thus he concludes:
Like liberals, communitarians would have a more difficult
time with the hard case of moderate risk, but they would grant
the state more latitude. They would recognize the deficiencies
in government claims-lack of specificity in the risk
assessment and lack of clarity in the efficacy of the
intervention. Yet, they would stress the government's
obligation to safeguard health and security. Communitarians
would not see a stark conflict between individuals and the
oppressive state. Rather they would perceive the government,
acting on behalf of the population, seeking to reduce a risk
common to all. Ideas of community would lead them to
conclude that everyone would be better off if each person
ceded a small amount of liberty to achieve a safer and more
secure population.2"
This seems right to me. But another aspect of the communitarian
orientation (the democratic, progressive branch ofcommunitarianism, that
is) is revealed by the contrast I have just drawn between the judicial and
the deliberative process of moral reasoning and justification. Community
safety per se does not seem to me to be a particularly important value or
consideration for communitarianism, any more than individual rights and
liberty are unimportant. If community safety and security are important
(and they are) for communitarians, it is because they are the preconditions
for deliberative-democratic decision-making to function institutionally.
People gripped by fear of imminent danger, panic, hatred, and revenge will
not be capable of reasoning or the practice of justification under the

24. Gostin, supra note 5, at 1158.
25. Id.
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deliberative model. At such times, even the viability of the judicial model
is threatened, and people tend to turn to charismatic leaders who assert
rather than argue, provoke rather than persuade. Both liberals and
communitarians should be exceedingly nervous at this prospect. At such
times political theory can do little but hope that the citizenry returns to its
senses quickly and that countervailing checks and balances within the
government will prevent the worst abuses of power.
The lesson to be drawn from these considerations is that the political
process ofmoral reasoning, debate, and justification in public health policy
should be institutionally rich and commodious enough to incorporate both
the judicial and the deliberative model. Elites whose authority is based on
a kind of expertise in moral knowledge, or the ability to reason from
general moral principles to particular action-guiding conclusions, still have
an important role to play in public health policy and programs. That style
and form of justification continue to have widespread trust and appeal in
democratic publics, and they often provide philosophically coherent
accounts of what should be done and why in public affairs, including
public health.
But as we move away from bioterrorist attacks, emergency outbreaks,
and the like, to the less glamorous areas of public health, the importance
ofthe deliberative mode of moral and political discourse comes to the fore.
These areas have more to do with behavior modification, the elimination
of social discrimination, inequalities, and stigma, and the management of
chronic disease on the population level, than they do with quarantine,
confinement, or the commandeering of private property. They are less
about public health's police power than about its persuasive power; less
about coercion than about trust and the changing of hearts and minds. For
this purpose we need an institutional structure and a cultural practice of
moral justification closer to the deliberative than to the judicial model.
Like the public health infrastructure itself, this civic infrastructure of
deliberative politics and democratic citizenship is not in good repair. 6 It
needs concerted attention and significant investment.

26. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWuNG ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the decline of social capital and civic activity in the

United States).
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